ABSTRACT: This paper is a critical evaluation of claims that business exits should not be seen as failures, on the grounds that sometimes they correspond to voluntary liquidations, or because they are learning opportunities. This can be seen as further evidence of bias affecting entrepreneurship research -where failures are repackaged as successes. We reiterate that the vast majority of business exits are unsuccessful. Drawing on ideas from the organizational life course, we suggest that business death is a suitable word for describing business closure. Even ases of olu ta ha est li uidatio su h as eti e e t a meaningfully be described as business deaths.
Introduction
In this short note we investigate recent claims that the binary variable representing business survival/exit is underspecified, and that exits cannot be deemed equivalent to failures because many exits are successes. We suggest that death is a ette o d tha failu e to des i e the phenomenon of business exit. Behind this cavil about vocabulary, however, is a schema for understanding closure events -we underline that it is not helpful to consider business exits as successful events.
We begin with a conceptual discussion of types of exit (Section 2) where we claim that business exit always relates to unviable businesses -hethe the e elati el u ia le he taki g i to a ou t the e t ep e eu s outside optio s, o a solutel u ia le i the economic sense of being unable to cover its costs. Viable businesses that remain in operation even after the entrepreneur leaves (e.g. trade sale or initial public offering (IPO)) are not, in fact, cases of business death, but cases of business continuation. We then discuss the biases in the discussion surrounding business exit, and the trivialization of business closu e "e tio . I "e tio , e a gue that usi ess death is a app op iate te fo des i i g usi ess e it ut that usi ess failu e is ot . Section 5 concludes.
Types of exit
To begin with, let us consider the cases of business survival, as depicted in Figure 1 . In some cases, such as an IPO or an acquisition involving the sale of the start-up, entrepreneurial exit can be considered to be a success. Brander et al (2010, p4) write that "using exits as a measure of success is standard in the venture capital literature." We would agree that this type of exit should be seen as a success. However, given that our paper is not concerned with entrepreneurial exit, or investor exit, but our unit of observation is the business, we can sidestep this category of events. This kind of successful entrepreneurial exit, according to which the business continues operations but under new management or with new investors, should be conceptualized as a case of business survival, not business exit -because the business survives even though the entrepreneur exits. We suggest, therefore, that this case should not in itself be taken as a counterexample to the ma i that all e its a e failu es e ause it is eithe a failu e o a usi ess e it. We therefore distance ourselves from the standard approach in the survival literature that considers merger and acquisition (M&A) to be a form of exit (e.g. Schary 1991; Cefis and Marsili 2006; Bhattacharjee et al 2009; Balcaen et al 2011) .
Although reincorporation and change of legal form may constitute a death and re-birth in the way these events are recorded in some national statistics databases, this is not a meaningful death/rebirth in an economic sense (Harada 2007 p403; Hoetker and Agarwal 2007 p447) , and statistical offices recognise this and are working on ways of no longer coding a change of legal form as a death and subsequent rebirth. Another type of exit (that is not included in Figure 1 ) occurs when a firm drops out of a dataset merely because it ceases to report to the database administrators -the firm survives, this is not an exit in any economic sense, but the inadvertent econometrician may treat it as a business exit.
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A crucial distinction, therefore, should be made between entrepreneurial exit and business exit, although most cases of business exit will correspond to entrepreneurial exit. In some cases, such as a trade sale or IPO, the business continues operation after the exit of the entrepreneur. In other cases, a portfolio entrepreneur may continue activity despite the death of one of the businesses in the portfolio.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The other categories in Figure 1 concern business exit, or business death. Empirical research has traditionally grouped all cases of business exit together into one category, represented by a binary variable (1=exit, 0 = survival, or vice versa). However, recently some scholars have claimed that this empirical strategy is not valid, because it groups together fundamentally heterogeneous groups, and that therefore business exit is underspecified. Business exits can be either successful or unsuccessful (Headd, 2003) . Exiting businesses are said to differ according to whether the exit decision was voluntary or involuntary. In the least successful case, the entrepreneur is forced into closure (by the bank or other creditors) because it is not able to generate enough cash flow to continue. In other cases, however, the entrepreneur may engage in voluntary closure if she has better outside options.
Ronstadt (1986, p333) analyzes questionnaire data on 95 ex-entrepreneurs (all of them Babson ollege alu i a d o se es that the ajo it of e its o espo ded to selli g out % o li uidatio % , ith a k upt o espo di g to % of e its a d ith the e ai i g 5% as u lea . Ho e e , "a majority (61%) of all exits found their entrepreneurial careers to be fi a iall disappoi ti g p . Headd (2003) also distinguishes between successful business closure and failure, after observing that many owners may have closed a business without excess debt, or retired from the work force. After four years, 50% of new employer firms survived, 17% were "closed and successful", and 33% were "closed and unsuccessful" (Headd, 2003 Figure 1 ). Harada (2007 , Table 1 ) examines the reasons for exit among a sample of Japanese small firms that e ited. Despai i g pe eptio of fu the usi ess is the ai easo i . % of e its, ith agi g of the a age at %, ill ess o i ju of the a age at %, a d a k upt ies at %. Overall, . % of e its a e lassified as e o o i fo ed e it hile . % a e o -e o o i fo ed e it.
Similarly, Watson and Everett (1993, Table 2 ) observe that only 6% of business discontinuances were outright bankruptcies, in their sample of young Australian businesses operating in shopping centres. Balcaen et al. (2011) analyze 6118 distress-related exits in Belgium, and 41% exit through a courtdriven exit procedure (mainly bankruptcy), 44% are voluntarily liquidated, and 14% undergo M&A.
We a gue he e that olu ta losu e a e ha a te ized as elati ely unviable ith i olu ta losu e ei g a solutely unviable . We defi e elati el u ia le as the ase he e the business has failed to be a viable economic entity when the entrepreneur considers her other outside options, even if it generates enough revenue to cover its costs: "If one remains with the current venture, it is because the alternatives are less attractive. ... departure requires only that a superior alternative has become available to the entrepreneur" (Bates, 2005, p345) . The business has perhaps played a useful role in the past, but now the opportunity cost of the business remaining in operation is too high to allow it to continue. The business is underperforming and failing to cover its costs, when we also factor in the opportunity costs to the entrepreneur. It is reasonable to expect that entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital have attractive outside options of finding employment elsewhere if their business performs poorly, and therefore have higher exit thresholds because of their higher opportunity costs (Gimeno et al 1997; Grilli 2011) . The business may also be elati el u ia le if the entrepreneur has fallen ill and withdraws from the business, because the owner now has other priorities (that is, taking care of her illness).
We defi e a solutel u ia le as the case when a business fails to cover its costs even when we lea e aside issues of the e t ep e eu s opportunity cost. Ou defi itio of a solutel u ia le therefore roughly corresponds to the defi itio of usi ess failu e i U asa a et al , p :
the cessation of involvement in a venture because it has not met a minimum threshold for economic viability as stipulated by the (founding) entrepreneur.
While involuntary business closure corresponds to bankruptcy, voluntary business closure refers to li uidatio , hi h a e des i ed as eithe a ha est li uidatio o a dist ess li uidation (Wennberg et al, 2010) . Of these two latter outcomes, harvest liquidation is considered to be more successful than distress liquidation. Harvest liquidation corresponds to the liquidation of a successful business, for motivations such as retirement, or perhaps the natural winding-down of projects that had always been thought of as short-term projects (such as the organization of a one-off festival or other such event).
In our view, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary closure is not always very helpful. In particular, self-reported evaluations undertaken by unsuccessful entrepreneurs are likely to be strongly affected by cognitive biases -according to which the entrepreneur wants to paint herself in a positive way to protect her self-esteem. Indeed, one of the most widely-accepted character traits of entrepreneurs is that they are remarkably optimistic (see e.g. Frank, 1988; Hayward et al, 2006; Dawson and Henley, 2012) .
Furthermore, many business exits that are classified as voluntary closures would have been classified as involuntary closures had the business closure taken place shortly afterwards. The analogy here ould e that of a ga le o a losi g st eak, ho de ides to uit hile still ahead a d lea es the gambling table before they have completely exhausted their stock of gambling chips. This kind of exit is neither a clear case of success nor failure -it is a last-dit h atte pt to s at h i to f o the ja s of defeat . Marlow et al (2011) engage in interviews with the owners of 15 closed and/or failed businesses and conclude that many voluntary closures are in fact anticipations of inevitable failures a ki g up thei a gu e t ith i te ie uotes su h as It as olu ta ut a tuall , I had o hoi e a d I did it just before the bank did... The bank made it very clear that they were about to pull the plug hi h ea t I ould t pa the ages so I got the e fi st Ma lo et al, , p. . As a result, we consider that self-reported data on the success of an exit should be treated with suspicion.
One area in which the distinction between voluntary and involuntary closure may be important concerns the emotional consequences for the entrepreneur. 2 Shepherd (2003 Shepherd ( , 2009 ) discusses how negative emotion affects sense-maki g a d opi g ith failu e, suggesti g the te g ief, i
recognition that a firm failure can be considered as a death. However, we underline that grief recovery is a phenomenon that takes place at the level of the entrepreneur, and not at the business level.
Biases in the discussion of business exit: the trivialization of business death
The entrepreneur has long been cast in a positive light (Nightingale and Coad, 2013 2 To the extent that failures have negative emotional consequences, they are not considered to be successful events for the entrepreneur. 3 John Haltiwanger has compiled a fascinating list of quotes by Barack Obama, George W Bush, and other top US politicians expressing considerable admiration for small business owners. 4 Looki g at UK data, "to e : p esti ates that the a ual total fi a ial suppo t fo s all usi ess is equivalent to a public expenditure of GBP 7.9 billion . . . To contextualize that expenditure, each year the UK spe ds o e ta pa e s o e o s all usi esses tha it spe ds o the poli e fo e . "ee also Hughes , Table 1 ) for a breakdown of this figure of £7.9 billion.
One recent trend in the pro-entrepreneurship movement and entrepreneurship policy concerns efforts to liberate unsuccessful e t ep e eu s f o the stig a of failu e that an uncomprehending society has heaped upon them, and to encourage them to start again. Instrumental to this is the need to trivialize business death.
Business failure has been trivialized to some extent by popular anecdotes, usually dating from the distant past. One cheerful quote that periodically pops up is att i uted to He discontinued. This leaves us in a rather absurd and asymmetric situation in which scholars are allowed to talk about the birth and survival of new businesses, but not about their deaths. 5 Figure 2 highlights this biased use of terminology. It appears that scholars are only permitted to use positive terms for entrepreneurs, and not negative ones.
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We suggest that this as et i pe spe ti e is incompatible with the sober evaluation of costs and benefits to which scholars should aspire. Knott and Posen (2005) ask Is Failu e Good? and conclude in the affirmative. They write that failu e appea s to be good for the economy (p617), that failed e t ep e eu s a e as he oi as su essful e t ep e eu s p , and that their insights a lead to policies that stimulate e efi ial failu e (p617). In essence, their main findings on the benefits of failure are that exiting firms are so inefficient that their departure increases the average efficiency of surviving firms. 7 In our view, the finding that exit of inefficient firms increases the average efficiency of survivors is not i itself e ide e that failu e is good , ut i stead it offe s suppo t to the otio that su i al of high-productivity firms is good , o o e p e isel that the a sence of low productivity firms is not bad.
5 It ould appea that lassi te ts su h as Alf ed Ma shall s t ees of the field a alog he e e fi s a e likened to young trees that struggle to grow tall and strong, while some succumb along the way) need rewriting in politically correct form, so as not to offend the sensitivities of 21 st century entrepreneurs (see Marshall, 1961 p263, first edition published 1890). 6 Note that "to e a d W a z k le e l a oid the o t o e sial o d death iti g a out the su i al a d o -su i al of e usi esses. 7 To be precise, they claim to identify three effects: a selection effect, a competition effect and a spillover effect. The selection effect has been described above. The competition effect, we argue, relates to entry rather than exit -the competition effect would presumably be even larger if there was no exit (because there would be a larger number of active competitors). The spillover effect is questionable, we argue, because their measure of spillovers does not accurately capture the concept of the specific benefits offered by failing firms (alone) to survivors -instead it is merely a measure of accumulated industry output -e assu e that spillo e s a e a function of the cumulative activity of all firms i the a ket p .
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
We consider it to be a dangerous trend in entrepreneurship research to consider business closures as successes. We are heading towards a situation in which the entrepreneur will be glorified to the extent that even her failures must be considered to be successes. In our view, if we continue spreading the message that entrepreneurs are welcome to fail, and start again, then the economic consequences could be severe.
One way in which business closures have been revamped as success stories is to repackage them as lea i g oppo tu ities. The e o o i odel ehi d this t pe of lea i g is alled Jo a o i lea i g o passi e lea i g , afte Jo a o i . 8 The model suggests that entrepreneurs start up their business without knowing their true, time-invariant, individual-specific level of business skill or productivity level, and it takes time to observe whether they are viable entrepreneurs or not.
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Starting a business is therefore necessarily a process of exploration. On this theme, Bates (2005, p350) writes "These entrants have paid to take a look; if the resultant learning experience is valuable, closure is apt to be successful." In our view, when an entrepreneur learns that she is a low quality entrepreneur, this is not a success story. If anything, it is a failure. Learning from failure may have some advantages (if the evidence were to show that learning is economically valuable), but it should e alled lea i g f o failu e a d certainly a ot e alled lea i g f o su ess . Therefore, the closure event can only be seen as a failure rather than a success. Furthermore, whether or not there has ee a e o o i all sig ifi a t lea i g f o failu e a ot e assu ed out ight, but it is an empirical question requiring careful examination.
Jovanovic learning assumes that individual entrepreneurs have fixed skill levels over their lifetimes, and struggle to learn about their inherent talents. Hence, in this Jovanovic learning framework, i di iduals ho ha e paid to take a look a d o se ed that the a e u su essful should ot eenter, because they now know that they do not have the business skills required for success. A worrying trend in entrepreneurship research is first of all to characterise business deaths as successful learning events, and furthermore to justify (and subsidize) re-entry of unsuccessful entrepreneurs on the grounds that their previous business experience was a success! One useful analogy for understanding new business outcomes is the lottery model (Storey, 2011), which constitutes a randomized benchmark or null hypothesis against which entrepreneurial learning from failure can be understood. Entrepreneurs buy a lottery ticket (business start-up), o fide t that thei ha es of i i g a e a o e-the-odds , ut ha i g little o t ol o e out o es, and most will fail while a few will enjoy remarkable success. The winners will figure prominently in the press, while the losers will be largely ignored. In the lottery model perspective, the fact that some lottery winners will win the lottery after losing the previous week does not in itself suggest that failing the lottery has any benefits, or that it is possible to learn from past mistakes to better play the lottery. Furthermore, in relation to Jovanovic learning, buying a lottery ticket that is then observed to lose cannot be considered to be a successful learning event. The lottery model of business performance can be extended from being a game of pure chance, to other games of chance where there is an element of skill (such as poker or blackjack) -the key issue in the analogy, however, is that there is a predominant role of chance (Storey, 2011; Coad et al, 2013) .
The possible existence of learning effects after previous business failure does not have strong empirical support. The crucial question regarding learning from failure is whether there is evidence of increased performance after failure, with gains large enough to offset the losses, when comprehensive representative data is analyzed. Of course, learning from failure should be analyzed not from anecdotal evidence from ex post success stories (such as Henry Ford and Walt Disney, whose success after failure is not inconsistent with the lottery model shown above, because sometimes gamblers win the lottery after having previously lost) but from large-sample evidence, covering both successes and failures, and covering a recent time frame. Entrepreneurs who were previously unsuccessful (who have allegedly experienced learning from failure) should be compared to an appropriate control group of new entrepreneurs who have no entrepreneurial experience. Prior business experience, and learning from failure, should be distinguished from confounding factors such as industry experience and start-up size. 10 The available evidence on prior business experience, and learning from failure, does not find that prior business experience improves subsequent business outcomes (Metzger, 2006 (Metzger, , 2007 Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2011; Frankish et al 2012) . Oosterbeek et al (2010) apply rigorous econometric analysis to evaluate the impact of a leadi g e t ep e eu ship edu atio p og a o ollege stude ts e t ep e eu ship skills a d motivation, and observe that hile the e is o sig ifi a t effe t o stude ts self-assessed entrepreneurial skills, the effect on their intentions to become entrepreneurs is negative. (These non-significant results for learning after failure should not be taken lightly, considering the publication bias against non-significant results.) The empirically-observed lack of entrepreneurial learning from prior failure can be explained in terms of a lack of opportunities for reinforcement learning in the context of fundamentally heterogeneous business opportunities (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Muehlfeld et al, 2012) , coupled with overoptimism and cognitive biases on the part of entrepreneurs (Frankish et al, 2012) .
Death: the suggested term for business exit
I this se tio e a gue that death is a app op iate te to des i e usi ess e it. We egi dis ussi g so e sho t o i gs of the te failu e , efo e e plai i g h e p efe the te death .
Why failure is not a good term
We a gue that failu e a i deed e take to e a pejorative word because it implies that everything that happened during the life of a firm was futile. A firm that is characterized as a failure ill e ie ed as a failu e fo the hole of its p e ious e iste e. Although the te death of a fi is o siste t ith the pe spe ti e that it as good hile it lasted , the o d failu e i plies that the fi s e ti e e iste e as a ea i gless waste of time. For example, the failed Japanese templebuilding firm Kongō Gumi, founded in 578, was for a long time the world's oldest continuously ongoing independent company, before it went into liquidation in 2006. It does not seem appropriate to characterize the 1400-year existence of this firm as a failure, because in many ways it was a remarkably successful business. It can be anticipated that all firms currently in existence will exit the market at some point, whether it be from poor management or just bad luck. Does this mean that all of our economic activity will ultimately prove to be a failure? That is an unnecessarily pessimistic perspective.
Humans are born, live their lives, and then die. An entrepreneur on her death-bed need not admit that her life was a failure. It ould e ad taste to sta t talki g of so eo e as a failu e at thei funeral, because many of the events undertaken during their lifetime will be considered as valuable and widely appreciated. However, the term death does not contradict the view that the activities undertaken during their lifetime were successful.
No etheless, e a ti ipate that the o d failu e ill o ti ue to e used, at least to des i e certain aspects of a defunct firm (i.e. the unsuccessful economic performance rather than its possi le su esses i othe di e sio s su h as o e s ell-being and social relationships), mainly because the word is convenient and idel u de stood. Fo e a ple, the ph ase lea i g f o failu e a ot easil e epla ed ith a su stitute lea i g f o death is rather awkward, lea i g f o u su essful e pe ie es is rather lo g, a d lea i g f o su ess would be entirely misleading).
Business death as a politically-correct term
We a gue, i o t ast to Bates , that death is ot a alue-lade o pejo ati e te that denigrates the efforts of entrepreneurs. The dead are rarely held in contempt simply because they died. Instead, death is a word that meaningfully describes the te i al stage i a usi ess life course; it constitutes a clear dissolution of activity. Death occurs when a firm has outlived its particular purpose and ceases to operate.
An advantage is the term death is that the voluntary or involuntary nature of the death is largely irrelevant. While terms such as atio al sui ide exist (Chen et al, 2012) , and this might somehow be construed as a su essful e it , e a e all ag eed that a sui ide ou ts as a death. E e i those cases where voluntary death (i.e. suicide) occurs, this is never taken as a sign of success, but is treated with respect as the final end of the living being. Even in societies where suicide is, in some circumstances, socially encouraged (e.g. Harakiri in Japan in the Edo era), this is not taken as a success but as 'the better of two evils' and is mourned appropriately.
The categorization of suicide as a form of death is helpful to understand that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary business exit is in many ways irrelevant -at least from a business population perspective, and from the perspective of net employment (although probably not from the perspective of the reputation or grief of the entrepreneur). Self-reported perceptions of the exiting entrepreneur do little to change the underlying economic significance of the business deaththat all things taken together, the business is no longer viable and has been terminated. However, one area in which the perceived success of a defunct business is relevant to policy is if unsuccessful entrepreneurs should be encouraged (and subsidized) to re-enter entrepreneurship on the basis of thei p io su ess .
In the case of retirement liquidation, the association of the business exit with death is even more natural, because the entrepreneur s expected death, and gradual slowdown before death, drives her retirement decision. The kind of firm involved in a retirement liquidation will probably not be the kind of high-impact innovative high-growth firm sought by policy-makers (or if it is, it will continue business under a new owner), but rather will probably be the sort of lifestyle firm that makes only a low economic contribution. Although some scholars have categorized retirement liquidation as a successful entrepreneurial exit i.e. ha est li uidatio , we consider it especially appropriate to label retirement liquidation as a business death. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, it matters little if the retirement decision is a successful business termination or an unsuccessful one -because few successful entrepreneurs will consider re-entering business after having closed down for retirement.
Concluding remarks
We argue that entrepreneurship research has gone too far in trivializing the death of businesses and rebranding these exits as successes. We agree with an observation in Marlow et al (2011, p. 1) that the pe dulu et ee failu e a d losu e has s u g too fa to a ds the latte offe i g a o e e ig i age of e t ep e eu ial pote tial a d p ospe ts. We argue that business death is a suitable term for business exits -both voluntary and involuntary exits. We consider that it would be appropriate to try to e o e the o d failu e f o ou e t ep e eu ship o a ula , ut ot the o d death . Although we acknowledge that some business exits will be voluntary, nonetheless it should be recognized that the vast majority of business exits will correspond to the necessary demise of unviable businesses.
I the u e t e a of the e t ep e eu , i hi h the figure of the entrepreneur receives considerable adulation, there is a need for solid econometric work to address empirical questions. It is not sufficient to speculate that business deaths are successes because they provide learning opportunities -what we need is robust econometric evidence from representative large-scale samples regarding whether individuals emerging from prior business deaths do actually perform better than a suitable control group, and if the learning benefits outweigh the combined social costs of prior business failure. After all, small business failure can be very costly to an economy (Watson and Everett, 1993) . To date, however, the available evidence suggests that such learning effects are not present. Amid observations that the number of entrepreneurs is already excessive (de Meza, 2002; Shane, 2009) , the policy of encouraging unsuccessful entrepreneurs to start again is potentially disastrous, and should be given thorough investigation, rather than being based on mere assumption.
Further work might also benefit from looking at the subjective well-being or life-satisfaction scores of entrepreneurs (Binder and Coad, 2012) . For example, if entrepreneurs emerging from selfassessed olu ta e its e pe ie e egati e sho ks to their happiness scores, then this would cast doubt on the voluntary nature of their exit decision.
Finally, we live in hope that developments will be made in databases so that future work will be able to properly classify events such as IPO and M&A as business continuations rather than deaths and rebirths.
